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Complaint centre usage agreement | Bizbilla.comComplaint centre usage agreement | complaint definition legal

Agreement on Use of Complaint Center


Bizbilla provides this service based on the following terms and conditions.

Parties to this agreement are Complaint Center users (hereinafter referred to as “Users”) and (hereinafter referred to as “Bizbilla”).

1. Definition

1.1 Complaint Center (hereinafter referred to as “the System”) – means a computer software program developed by Bizbilla to allow Users to sign in to the System and report suspected transaction disputes, product information in violation of our policies, etc..

1.2 User – means any person (whether an individual or an entity) who uses the System to report or respond to complaints.

2. Effect of Agreement

2.1 This Agreement includes the body herein contained and any rules that Bizbilla has issued or may from time to time issue in the future for the System. All such rules shall form an integral part of this Agreement and have the same legal effect as the body of this Agreement herein contained.

2.2 When using the System, User promises to accept and comply with all relevant rules. Bizbilla reserves the right to supplement and amend this Agreement and all related rules at its sole discretion from time to time and Bizbilla will inform User of related changes in an appropriate manner. If User does not accept the relevant changes, he should stop using the System. Once the revised Agreement has been published on, it takes effect immediately. All related rules, which also form part of this Agreement, will take effect upon their release. If User signs in to or continues to use the System, he shall be deemed to have accepted the revised Agreement. Unless otherwise expressly stated, any new content that widens the coverage of the System or enhances its function shall be subject to this Agreement.

2.3 After User has confirmed acceptance of this Agreement, the Agreement shall have legal effect as between User and Bizbilla. User should read this Agreement carefully before using the System. If there is any doubt, he may consult Bizbilla or his own legal advisers. Irrespective of whether User has actually read this Agreement carefully before using the System, as long as he has clicked the "Confirm" button at the bottom of the body of this Agreement, User is deemed to have consented to and entered into this Agreement.

3. Instructions for Using the System

3.1 When submitting a complaint, User must submit supporting materials in accordance with the requirements of the System, including but not limited to the complaint form, related transaction proof and so on. User warrants that the information and all materials submitted by him are true, lawful, timely, valid and accurate.

3.2 When submitting a complaint, User has the obligation to provide correct information and warrants the validity and security of such information as e-mail address, telephone number, address etc. and shall ensure that Bizbilla and the party being complained of can contact him through the aforesaid contact information. In addition, User should send a written notice to Bizbilla immediately upon there being any changes in the relevant information.

3.3 When the System shows a successful submission of complaint, it only means that User has completed the submission in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the System and it does not necessarily follow that Bizbilla will accept the complaint or deal with the complaint in the way requested.

3.4 When the submitted information meets the complaint standard, Bizbilla will inform the company being complained of about the complaint, and ask him to respond to the complaint within a reasonable period. Bizbilla has the right to modify the response period in light of the actual situation. Once the response period is over and the company being complained of has not responded, Bizbilla has the right to impose certain punishment on him accordingly.

3.5 If the company being complained of submits a counter-notice within the response period, which is considered as reasonable and valid prima facie, Bizbilla will forward the counter-notice details to the complainant and ask him to respond to it within a reasonable period of time. If the complainant objects to the counter-notice, the complainant may file a dispute notice with Bizbilla.

3.6 User acknowledges and agrees that Bizbilla has no responsibility or ability to judge / decide the authenticity of the contents and merits of the complaint and the counter-notice. Bizbilla is neither a law enforcement unit nor a judge / arbiter of business disputes. Bizbilla shall not be responsible for any suspected frauds / business misconducts made by its members.

3.7 At any time during the process of the complaint, Bizbilla has the right to require User to supplement any information or provide any additional material in relation to the complaint. After receiving request for additional information in relation to the complaint, User must provide relevant information in timely manner in accordance with the requirements of Bizbilla. If there is a failure to do so, Bizbilla shall have the right to treat the complaint as not having been submitted.

4. User Declaration

User declarations and warranties

(a) User warrants that he is legally entitled, subject to civil law, and has the right and capacity to file complaints legitimately.

(b) Bizbilla acts as an internet information service platform, who does not have the ability to determine whether any information published on the website may constitute any infringement or settle transaction dispute issues, etc.. Bizbilla has the right to consider a way to handle the aforementioned counter-notices to be submitted by companies being complained of accordingly.

(c) The whole complaint procedure to be processed over the System is in compliance with national laws, regulations and relevant provisions, as well as all relevant aspects of social and public interests or public morals. If there is any violation giving rise to legal consequences, User undertakes to assume all corresponding legal responsibilities in his own name.

(d) User agrees that Bizbilla has the right to disclose relevant information of the complaint, including but not limited to contact information, complaint details and relevant supporting documentation to complainants / companies being complained of for the purposes of processing and settling complaints.

(e) User agrees not to use any information from the System for any purposes other than processing and settling related complaints.

(f) User agrees to receive e-mail and information from Bizbilla and its affiliates.

5. Termination of Use of the System

Bizbilla has the right to terminate any use of the System at any time without further notice for the circumstances as follow:

(a) User violates any provision of this Agreement

(b) Any materials submitted by User for complaint is fake or contains anything false or illegal

(c) User expressly indicates his unwillingness to accept a new or revised agreement

(d) Any circumstances that Bizbilla may in its sole discretion consider necessary to terminate use of the System

6. Post Termination of Use of the System

6.1 After the termination of use, Bizbilla has no obligation to keep any complaint related information after the termination of use of the System. Bizbilla has the right to delete the information after a reasonable period of time.

6.2 Regardless of the manner of which Bizbilla terminates the use of the System, Bizbilla reserves its right to:

(a) Keep or not to keep User's complaint records;

(b) Take appropriate actions against User who breached this Agreement or performed any illegal conduct before termination of use of the System.

7. Change and Suspension to the System

7.1 User agrees that Bizbilla may at its sole discretion change or suspend part or all of the System’s functionality and usage thereof and delete any material User has submitted to the System without notifying User or being liable to User or any third party.

7.2 User understands that Bizbilla has to maintain and / or may need to repair the System and / or its related equipment on a regular or irregular basis. Bizbilla does not bear any responsibility towards User for any delay or suspension of the use of the System for the said situations.

8. Intellectual Property Rights

8.1 Bizbilla is the intellectual property right owner of all contents of the System, including but not limited to word articles, pictures, files, website design, and any intellectual property materials therein. The intellectual property rights of the aforesaid materials are, including but not limited to trademark rights, patent rights, copyrights, commercial secrets, etc..

8.2 Without prior written consent from Bizbilla, no individual or entity shall use, modify, copy, distribute publicly, change, disseminate, issue or publish publicly any intellectual property materials of the System, including the system technology and programming.

8.3 If User infringes on any of Bizbilla’s intellectual property rights, Bizbilla reserves the right to take appropriate actions to claim any loss caused by User’s infringing conduct under the laws.

9. Privacy Policy

9.1 Scope

The following provisions apply to any information received and recorded by Bizbilla from User’s browser at the time User visits the System’s webpage, including but not limited to IP addresses.

9.2 Use of Information

(a) Bizbilla only uses the collected information for the purposes of processing related complaints and data analysis internally. Bizbilla will neither use the collected information for any purposes other than the aforesaid nor share them with any third party (except Bizbilla Group and its affiliates).

(b) Bizbilla does not allow any third party to collect, edit, sell or disseminate for free the User's personal information by any means. If Bizbilla discovers any User engaged in the aforesaid activities, Bizbilla has the right to cease all the access rights to the System of User immediately without further notice.

9.3 Information Disclosure

(a) User's information may be partially and fully disclosed for the situations as follow: (b) User consents to disclose the information to a designated third party for a specific purpose

(c) In compliance with relevant provisions of any applicable laws, or upon requests of national official bodies empowered by the laws, User information may be disclosed accordingly

(d) Upon request of a third party who has obtained a judicial order for related information disclos yxmjhxfd. moncler mens knit hature

(e) Any information disclosures that Bizbilla considers appropriate which are regulated and / or allowed under the laws.

10. Amend Agreement

10.1 Bizbilla reserves the right to amend any provision of this Agreement. If there is any change to any provision of this Agreement, Bizbilla will intimate User of relevant changes in an appropriate manner.

10.2 If User disagrees with any change of this agreement, he is free to stop using the System. If User continues to use the System, he is deemed to accept all changes of this Agreement.

11. Notification Delivery

11.1 Bizbilla may send notification to User by ways of webpage bulletins, emails, short message service (“SMS”) or regular mail delivery, etc. Notification is deemed to be received by User on the date it is sent.

11.2 User should send his messages to Bizbilla through the physical addresses, fax numbers, e-mail addresses and other information published on the System.

12. Jurisdiction

This Agreement shall be construed and governed by the laws of Indian Territory; and any dispute arising thereof shall be submitted to the courts of Tamilnadu, India.

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moncler usa retail llc Extortion Download article as a PDF

Extortion is the crime of obtaining money or property by threat to a victim's property or loved ones, intimidation, or false claim of a right.

What Is Extortion?

Most states define extortion as the gaining of property or money by almost any kind of force, or threat of 1) violence, 2) property damage, 3) harm to reputation, or 4) unfavorable government action. While usually viewed as a form of theft/larceny , extortion differs from robbery in that the threat in question does not pose an imminent physical danger to the victim.

Extortion is a felony in all states. Blackmail is a form of extortion in which the threat is to expose embarrassing and damaging information to family, friends, or the public. Inherent in this common form of extortion is the threat to expose the details of someone's private lives to the public unless money is exchanged.

Another common extortion crime is offering "protection" to a businessman to keep his business safe from burglary or vandalism. For example, Dan goes to Victor's place of business and demands monthly payment from Victor for the business's "protection" from vandalism and after-hours theft. Fearing that he or his business will suffer harm otherwise, Victor agrees to pay Dan.

Extortion can take place over the telephone, via mail, text, email or other computer or wireless communication. If any method of interstate commerce is used in the extortion, it can be a federal crime.

Extortion Statutes

Virtually all extortion statutes require that a threat must be made to the person or property of the victim. Threats to harm the victim's friends or relatives may also be included. It is not necessary for a threat to involve physical injury. It may be sufficient to threaten to accuse another person of a crime or to expose a secret that would result in public embarrassment or ridicule. The threat does not have to relate to an unlawful act.

Other types of threats sufficient to constitute extortion include those to harm the victim's business and those to either testify against the victim or withhold testimony necessary to his or her defense or claim in an administrative proceeding or a lawsuit. Many statutes also provide that any threat to harm another person in his or her career or reputation is extortion.

Cyber Extortion: A Growing Threat

While you believe that extortion only happens in smoky back rooms or among shady Mafia characters, it can happen right here at your fingertips. Cyber extortion, a new way for criminals to take hold of your property, is on the rise in a modern society. Cyber criminals use a tool known as " ransomware ," to encrypt a user’s important files and documents, making them unreadable, until a ransom is paid. No specific business or individual appears to be the target, but cyber criminals tend to focus their efforts on against larger-scale targets such as corporations with large amounts of data and deeper pockets. 

Get a Free Case Evaluation with a Local Criminal Defense Lawyer

If you're having heated discussions with a business associate, a client, a friend or a family member and your words might be taken as a threat to gain money or other advantage, then the police could arrest you and charge you with extortion. If you're facing criminal investigation, your best move is to immediately get a free case review from a criminal defense attorney to better understand your situation and your options.

The State is correct in that Bacon challenged the sufficiency of the preliminary hearing because the probable cause finding was based on hearsay testimony in his motion to dismiss. Moreover, the State is correct that Bacon no longer challenges the alleged hearsay problems while attacking the sufficiency of the preliminary hearing on appeal. Nevertheless, in Bacon's motion to dismiss, Bacon did argue that the preliminary hearing was insufficient as to the commercial exploitation of a child charges. Specifically, Bacon alleged that even if certain hearsay was admissible, that hearsay was "insufficient to find that the offense of sexual exploitation of a child had been committed." Bacon alleged that there was no evidence indicating that he "enticed, encouraged, coerced, or otherwise persuaded A.M.H. to engage in sexually explicit conduct" or that A.M.H. did in fact "engage[] in a sexually explicit performance."

Accordingly, Bacon did make this argument below in his motion to dismiss filed the morning of trial. As a result, the State is incorrect in asserting that Bacon's argument is not properly before this court.

Is Bacon's Argument Moot?

Our Supreme Court has explained: "As a general principle, after an accused has gone to trial and has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, any error at the preliminary hearing stage is considered harmless unless it appears that the error caused prejudice at trial." State v. Jones, 290 Kan. 373, 381, 228 P.3d 394 (2010). Prejudice "at trial" requires a showing of harm during trial. In essence, minor errors that occur at a preliminary hearing are moot if the defendant has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. Consequently, for Bacon's argument to ultimately succeed on appeal, he must establish two things: (1) that error occurred at his preliminary hearing, and (2) that the error resulted in prejudice at his trial.

Bacon has failed to establish that the alleged preliminary hearing error resulted in prejudice at his trial. In fact, Bacon has failed to even recognize that he has the burden of establishing that prejudice occurred at his trial in his brief. In short, Bacon's failure to argue how he was prejudiced by the alleged preliminary hearing error at his trial means he has abandoned any argument he may have had regarding such prejudice. See Williams, 303 Kan. at 758. Given that Bacon has failed to meet his burden of establishing prejudice, this court may affirm.

Is Bacon's Underlying Argument Meritless?

For argument sake, however, even if Bacon's argument was not moot, Bacon's underlying arguments are meritless. If one disregards the alleged misapplication of Local Rule 301, the entirety of Bacon's argument is that no evidence at the preliminary hearing supported that he "intentionally" assisted A.M.H. to engage in the selling of sexual relations. Bacon points out that Detective Baumann "never testified as to why [he] transported A.M.H. on the relevant nights, only that he knew what she was planning on doing."

Yet, Detective Baumann's testimony that Bacon told him (1) that he transported A.M.H. to the Broadway area on the nights in question and (2) that he knew A.M.H. was going to engage in prostitution was likely sufficient to make a probable cause finding on the commercial exploitation of a child charges. This evidence in conjunction with Detective Baumann's testimony that Bacon also told him that he had asked A.M.H. to make money, that he had known she was 17 years old, that he had brought A.M.H. to Broadway on two separate nights, that he had taken A.M.H.'s money at the end of both nights, and that he had used A.M.H.'s money to buy things for himself was more than sufficient evidence to make a probable cause finding on the commercial exploitation of a child charges. As noted by the State in its brief, the preceding evidence was highly incriminating. More importantly, the fact that Bacon knowingly transported A.M.H. to Broadway so she could engage in prostitution on two separate nights is incredibly significant because it means that there was probable cause to support that Bacon committed the two separate counts of commercial sexual exploitation of a child under the State's amended complaint.

Moreover, Bacon seems to forget that the probable cause finding can be based on circumstantial evidence. See State v. Logsdon, 304 Kan. 3, 25, 371 P.3d 836 (2016). The State may even use circumstantial evidence to establish a defendant's culpable mental state. See State v. Thach, 305 Kan. 72, 84, 378 P.3d 522 (2016) (holding that the State can prove a defendant's culpable mental state, including when the defendant acted "intentionally," entirely with circumstantial evidence). Thus, the evidence at Bacon's preliminary hearing needed only to be sufficient enough to allow a person to infer that Bacon intended to assist A.M.H. in the selling of sexual relations. Certainly, based on Detective Baumann's testimony about Bacon's interview, a person of ordinary prudence and caution could conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief that Bacon committed two counts of commercial sexual exploitation of a child under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 216422(a)(4), one count for each night he drove A.M.H. to Broadway, because the evidence

supported that Bacon knowingly transported A.M.H., a 17-year-old girl, with the intent that A.M.H. engage in selling sexual relations.

As a result, Bacon's underlying argument that insufficient evidence was presented at his preliminary hearing to bind him over on the commercial sexual exploitation of a child charges is meritless.

Did the Trial Court Err in Instructing the Jury?

Next, Bacon alleges that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the elements of commercial sexual exploitation of a child. Specifically, Bacon argues that because commercial sexual exploitation of a child states that a defendant must commit the act "with the intent to" assist a child to sell sex, the trial court was required to define the term "intentionally" as a culpable mental state within the jury instructions. The State concedes that the trial court could have defined "intentionally," but it argues that the lack of definition "does not translate into a finding that its absence was necessarily reversible error."

Standard of Review

An appellate court applies the following standard of review when reviewing jury instruction challenges:

"'"(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, the appellate court must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test and

degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012)."' [Citation omitted.]" State v. Fisher, 304 Kan. 242, 25657, 373 P.3d 781 (2016).

Neither party disputes that this issue is properly before this court given Bacon's request for the "intentionally" definition instruction below. Moreover, neither party disputes that the requested instruction on the "intentionally" definition was both legally and factually appropriate. Nevertheless, the State makes the concession that the trial court could have provided the jury with an instruction on the definition of "intentionally" as a culpable mental state with an important caveat: "'With the intent to' is not a highly technical concept, but amounts to mere ordinary words to which the jury can assign their ordinary meanings, to effectively and accurately analyze the offense within the facts of the case." Indeed, this is an incredibly important factor in determining if the trial court erred.

To review, K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6422(a)(4), the crime of commercial sexual exploitation of a child for which Bacon was convicted, states: "(a) Commercial sexual exploitation of a child is knowingly: . . . (4) procuring transportation for, paying for the transportation of or transporting any person younger than 18 years of age within this state with the intent of causing, assisting or promoting that person's engaging in selling sexual relations." (Emphasis added.) Thus, although one must knowingly help in the transporting of a person younger than 18 years of age to commit the crime, one must also have the intent to cause, assist, or promote the person under 18 years of age in engaging in the sale of sexual relations.

Both of the commercial sexual exploitation of a child instructions given by the trial court were identical. Moreover, both instructions conformed to PIK Crim. 4th 64.091, which outlines the commercial sexual exploitation of a child instruction, and PIK

Crim. 4th 52.010, which outlines the definition of "knowingly" as a culpable mental state. The entirety of the commercial sexual exploitation of a child instructions at issue stated:

"The defendant is charged with commercial sexual exploitation of a child. The defendant pleads not guilty. To establish this charge each of the following claims must be proved: "1. The defendant knowingly transported A.M.H. within this state with the intent of assisting A.M.H. to engage in selling sexual relations. "2. At the time of the act, A.M.H was less than 18 years old. The State need not prove the defendant knew the child's age. "3. This act occurred on or between the 4th day of August, 2014, and the 5th day of August, 2014, in Sedgwick County, Kansas.

"A defendant acts knowingly when the defendant is aware[:]

 of the nature of his conduct that the State complain[ed] about;  of the circumstances in which he was acting; or  that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause the result complained about by the State."

Accordingly, the jury was instructed on all of the elements of commercial sexual exploitation of a child, including that Bacon had to specifically intend to assist A.M.H. in selling sexual relations. As a result, despite Bacon's best efforts to argue otherwise, this is not a case where the jury was not instructed on an essential element of the crime. Instead, Bacon's argument only involves whether the jury misunderstood the meaning of "intentionally," given that it was not provided with a definition in the instructions.

K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5202(h), the statute that defines "intentionally" and "with the intent to" as a culpable mental state, provides: "A person acts 'intentionally,' or 'with intent,' with respect to the nature of such person's conduct or to a result of such person's

conduct when it is such person's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result."

Yet again, as the State has argued, the meaning of "intentionally" or "with the intent to" is not highly technical. Generally, jurors are "expected to decipher many difficult phrases without receiving specific definitions." State v. Robinson, 261 Kan. 865, 877, 934 P.2d 38 (1997). More importantly, although not explicitly addressed by the State in its brief, it is a longstanding rule of this court that trial courts only have a duty to define words within an instruction "'when the instructions as a whole would mislead the jury, or cause them to speculate, that additional terms should be defined.'" State v. Armstrong, 299 Kan. 405, 440, 324 P.3d 1052 (2014) (quoting State v. Norris, 226 Kan. 90, 95, 595 P.2d 1110 [1979]). Based on this rule, this court has concluded that trial courts are not required to define a word used in an instruction unless the meaning of the word under the commonly understood lay definition differs from the meaning of the word under its legal definition. State v. Patton, 33 Kan. App. 2d 391, 397, 102 P.3d 1195 (2004). In other words, the failure to give a definitional instruction cannot be erroneous unless the legal definition of the word at issue means something different in layman's terms.

In regards to the trial court's duty to define "intentionally" as a culpable mental state, this court has previously rejected this argument. For example, in State v. Morehead, No. 97,960, 2008 WL 2510576 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 287 Kan. 768 (2008), Moorhead had been charged and convicted of aggravated battery, which requires a person to "intentionally" cause another bodily harm. Moorhead appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the definition of "intentional." The Moorhead court, however, disagreed with Moorhead's argument. Noting that trial courts are not required to define words unless the lack of definition would cause confusion, the Moorhead court explained that the term "intentional" is both "widely used" and "readily comprehensible," meaning no defining instruction was

required. 2008 WL 2510576, at *5. The Moorhead court further noted that Moorhead's argument seemed particularly weak given that he did not allege that the term "intentional" meant something different when used in criminal elements instructions than in layman's terms. 2008 WL 2510576, at *5.

More recently, relying on Moorhead, this court again rejected that the trial court had a duty to define "intentionally" in State v. Hanks, No. 114,640, 2016 WL 4585620, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion). Convincingly, the Hanks court pointed out that the legislature's definition of "intentionally" under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5202 did not differ from the definition of the term as used by nonlawyers in Webster's II New College Dictionary 576, 610, and 926 (1995). 2016 WL 4585620, at *4.

This case is no different than Moorhead and Hanks. Bacon takes issue with the fact the definition of "intentionally" was not provided to the jury. Yet, Bacon has provided absolutely no argument as to why the trial court was required to instruct the jury on the definition of "intentionally." The closest thing to an argument Bacon makes is that because the trial court defined "knowingly" it should have also defined "intentionally," and in turn, its failure to define "intentionally" likely led the jury to believe that the only culpable mental state at issue was "knowingly." Nevertheless, this argument is purely speculative. Furthermore, the argument in no way addresses why the jury would not have understood the phrase "with the intent to" given that the phrase means the same thing under both its legal definition and its layman's definition.

Once more, a trial court's decision not to give an instruction defining a term cannot be deemed erroneous unless the legal definition and layman's definition of the word at issue differ. Patton, 33 Kan. App. 2d at 396. Consequently, by failing to provide any explanation why the jury needed to be instructed on the definition of "intentionally," Bacon has failed to brief the single argument that is required to establish the trial court erred. In turn, by failing to brief this argument, he has abandoned his argument on appeal.

See Williams, 303 Kan. at 758 (holding that an issue not briefed is abandoned). Moreover, even if Bacon had not abandoned his argument, his argument would still fail because, as addressed in Moorhead and Hanks, the definition of "intentionally" means the same thing under its legal definition and layman's definition, meaning no jury instruction on the definition was required. For these reasons, the trial court did not err when it denied Bacon's request for an instruction on the definition of "intentionally" as a culpable mental state.

Can Bacon Establish Harm?

Assuming arguendo that Bacon established that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the definition of "intentionally," Bacon would still not be entitled to reversal. Despite Bacon's argument that this court should use the constitutional harmless error standard because the lack of definition "functionally prevented the jury from returning a verdict which would be capable of finding Bacon guilty of all the essential elements of the charged crimes," the jury was instructed on all the elements of commercial sexual exploitation of a child. Consequently, Bacon's due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were not violated. See Hanks, 2016 WL 4585620, at *4 (holding the lack of definitional instruction does not constitute a constitutional error). As a result, under Ward, the jury instruction error would only result in reversible error if there was a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. See State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl.